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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to investigate determinants of fear of failure in entrepreneurial activity 
that could inhibit starting a business. The study uses cross-sectional, pooled OLS, and 
panel regressions. The dependent variable is fear of failure regarding entrepreneurship, 
measured with the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey question of whether 
fear of failure would prevent the responder from starting a firm. The unit of analysis is at 
country level. I categorize determinants into demographic, property rights, and 
procedural variables. A population of higher working age ratio (measured as the 
population aged 15-64 divided by the population aged 65 and over) correlates with a 
decreasing fear of failure. Additionally, stronger property rights appear to decrease fear 
of failure. I do not find a statistically significant relationship between fear of failure and 
procedural variables in my datasets. A binary variable for whether the country is in Asia 
appears to show a positive association with fear of failure, increasing it by ten percentage 
points. Since decreasing fear of failure is desirable to promote greater entrepreneurial 
activity, a better understanding of the determinants of fear of failure is essential to inform 
public policies to spur entrepreneurial growth. The findings from this study, while not 
conclusive, identify the importance of further research based on larger datasets and 
variables that are more robust.  
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1.  Introduction 
When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office in 2012, he vowed to transform the country 
into an “entrepreneurial powerhouse” (Ujikane 2016). However, in 2014 Japan had one 
of the lowest rates of total entrepreneurial activity at 3.63%, as measured by the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor. That year, Japan also had one of the highest rates of fear of 
failure for starting a business at 54.51%. The relationship between entrepreneurial 
activity and fear of failure is inverse to one another in the example of Japan, and this 
country is not the only one to face a similar relationship between the two variables.  
While a significant amount of academic research exists regarding determinants of 
entrepreneurship, the specific determinants of fear of failure in entrepreneurial activity 
deserve greater attention. The purpose of this paper is to investigate what independent 
variables impact fear of failure for starting a business. Fear of failure is measured by the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s statistic of the percentage of the population aged 18-
64 who indicate that fear of failure would prevent them from starting a business. In the 
next section, I discuss the existing literature regarding the importance of entrepreneurial 
activity, the relationship between entrepreneurship and fear of failure, and factors 
potentially affecting fear of failure. Afterward, I provide a description of the data and 
discuss the regression results. The final section discusses the limitations of the study.  
1.1 The Importance of Entrepreneurial Activity 
Entrepreneurship has been a key focus for governments, mainly due to prospects for 
economic growth. An increase in good market opportunities has been tied to growth of 
GDP (Audretsch and Fritsch 2002), while consistent positive economic growth has been 
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tied to high-growth-potential start-ups (Wong, et al. 2005) and fast-growing firms 
(Kemp, et al. 2000). In hopes of stirring greater growth, startup funding in Asian 
countries (such as Singapore and Indonesia) have more than doubled in recent years 
(Purnell 2016).  
Aside from economic growth and wealth levels, entrepreneurial activity links 
with lower unemployment as well. Haltiwanger, et al. (2013) show that newer and 
younger “entrepreneurial” firms are responsible for net job creation, not small businesses. 
The authors set up a regression examining net employment growth and find that small 
firms contribute to growth. However, once they control for firm age, there is no 
systematic relationship between firm size and growth. Instead, business start-ups and 
young businesses are the ones that promote job creation rather than just “small firms”. An 
important caveat exists. Haltiwanger, et al. (2013, pg. 360) acknowledge, “Young firms 
exhibit high rates of gross job creation and destruction ... we find that young firms have 
very high job destruction rates from exit, so that after five years, about 40% of the jobs 
initially created by start-ups have been eliminated by exit.” Yet once the firm survives, 
young firms grow at a faster pace than more mature businesses. This influence of 
entrepreneurship on the economy demonstrates the economic importance of studying 
possible determinants of new firm creation.  
1.2  Relationship between Entrepreneurship and Fear of Failure 
Past studies examine the connection between entrepreneurship and fear of failure in the 
context of entrepreneurial decisions and risk aversion (Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979). 
Research shows that risk aversion increases slowly between childhood and adulthood 
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(Harbaugh, et al. 2002). Young children are more influenced than adults are by the 
chance of winning and are more willing to take risks with negative consequences in the 
end. Given this tendency for individuals to develop risk aversion over time, fear of failure 
plays a significant role given the risk attached to starting a new business. In theory, 
decreasing the perception of the likelihood of failure should increase the probability that 
an individual will start a new venture (Weber and Milliman 1997). Weber and Milliman’s 
study looks at 24 MBA students at the Graduate School of Business at the University of 
Chicago rather than polling participants across different countries.  
Additionally, one study examining factors affecting nascent entrepreneurship, or 
those who started a business in the past twelve months, finds fear of failure to be 
statistically significant and negatively correlated with nascent entrepreneurship (Arenius 
and Minniti 2005). These results are consistent with Weber and Milliman’s theory. 
Arenius and Minniti’s work examines 28 countries across different continents, pointing to 
an international phenomenon rather than simply a regional one. This further proves the 
inverse relationship between fear of failure and entrepreneurship since the relationship 
applies to several different countries, indicating that there is more at work between the 
two variables than a cultural effect for one country.  
Additional scholars such as Vaillant and Lafuente (2007) and Stuetzer, et al. 
(2014) find fear of failure to have a strong negative relationship with entrepreneurial 
entry. Vaillant and Lafuente (2007, pg. 469) state, “...fear of failure has an institutional 
dimension to the extent that entrepreneurship in terms of starting a business is less 
accepted as a career option, and (failed) entrepreneurs face social stigmatization in less 
entrepreneurship approving institutional environments.” Vaillant and Lafuente (2007) 
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find social stigma regarding entrepreneurial failure to be an important constraint for 
entrepreneurial activity in Spain, as the social fear of entrepreneurial failure is 
statistically significant and negatively correlates with entrepreneurship. The authors 
conduct a rare events logit model regression to determine entrepreneurial activity within 
the region. Stuetzer, et al. (2014) include “fear of failure” as a control variable based on 
Arenius and Minniti’s (2005) work and once again support that “fear of failure” is 
statistically significant and negatively correlates with individual entrepreneurship. 
1.3 Factors Affecting Entrepreneurial Fear of Failure 
Though fear of failure exhibits a negative relationship with entrepreneurial activity levels, 
I wanted to know more about the determinants of fear of failure. Bosma and Schutjens 
(2010) examine fear of failure by merging GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) data 
over 2001-2006 and require GEM participation for at least 3 years during the 2001-2006 
period. They find that population density and population growth (signs of an urban 
region) negatively correlate with one’s fear of failure in starting a business. Yet the 
authors recognize that it is not the urbanization of an area that decreases fear of failure 
per se, but rather knowing entrepreneurs. Bosma and Schutjens (2010, pg. 728) say, “...it 
is not per se urban regions that are characterized by high rates of people perceiving 
economic opportunities or people mentioning having the skills and knowledge to start a 
firm, but regions where people know many start-up entrepreneurs.”  
From a policy standpoint, the number of nationally recognized start-up procedures 
related to registering a business appears to associate with an increased fear of failure. The 
World Bank Doing Business Project measures these procedures. Unemployment 
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positively correlates with one’s fear of failure in starting a business in Bosma and 
Schutjens’s study. Raffiee, et al. (2013) show that hybrid entrepreneurs (those that retain 
their day job before turning to full-time self-employment) have higher survival rates than 
those who enter self-employment directly from paid employment. Existing employment 
provides security for entrepreneurs to begin their venture. 
Wyrwich, et al. (2015) conduct a study examining Germany over a period of five 
years (2003-2006; 2008). They find that knowing an entrepreneur reduces fear of failure, 
as defined by GEM as the percentage of the aged 18-64 population who personally know 
someone who started a business in the past two years. The dependent variable is fear of 
failure regarding entrepreneurship, measured with the GEM question of whether fear of 
failure would prevent the responder from starting a firm (binary variable). These results 
are consistent with Bosma’s conclusion that knowing an entrepreneur, or being located in 
an area with high population density that provides exposure to entrepreneurs, decreases 
fear of failure. Wyrwich, et al. (2015) use logit regressions and control for age and 
gender. Fear of failure increases with age in younger years and increases at a slower pace 
in older years. Regarding gender, women are more likely to experience fear of failure. 
The authors also conduct a second model that includes controls on education, household 
income, and employment status.  Fear of failure also decreases with higher levels of 
educational attainment. Income negatively correlates with fear of failure, while 
unemployment positively correlates with fear of failure. Wyrwich’s explanation is that 
negative labor prospects magnify negative consequences, causing greater fear.  
Delmar and Davidson (2000) find age structure and gender partially explain firm 
formation rates. The perception of business-friendly national policies plays a significant 
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role. Weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in startup manufacturing firms 
(Johnson, et al. 1999). The study uses managers’ own evaluations of the security of their 
property rights and measures protection of property rights by inquiring how many 
“extralegal payments” go toward licenses, government services, and protection. Greater 
extralegal payments correspond with a lower sense of property rights protection. Another 
study by Desai, et al. (2003) finds that stronger property rights increase entry rates into 
entrepreneurial activity. The World Economic Forum’s “The Global Competitiveness 
Report” measures property rights on a seven-point scale. A score of “one” indicates 
nations without clearly formalized property rights and without strong protection by law 
and a score of “seven” indicates countries where the government formalizes and 
reinforces property rights. The survey asks participants, “In your country, to what extent 
are property rights, including financial assets, protected?” Participants receive a Likert-
scale type rating with 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “to a great extent.” Therefore, this property 
rights index is a self-reported measurement and does not reflect an objective 
measurement system. 
Aside from property rights, policies such as bankruptcy laws and taxes contribute 
to a firm’s chances for formation. Armour and Cumming (2008) find bankruptcy law to 
have a significant effect on entrepreneurship levels. The availability of a “fresh start” 
increases self-employment in the sample population, while high minimum capital 
requirements decrease self-employment. A “fresh start” refers to a forgiving bankruptcy 
law that allows an entrepreneur to re-enter the economy after his or her prior business 
fails. The minimum capital requirements refer to the cost of incorporating a business. In 
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addition, Lee, et al. (2011) find that less time and less cost associated with bankruptcy 
procedures encourages a greater number of firms to enter the market.  
Regarding taxes, the literature defines two main types of taxes that affect 
entrepreneurs: corporate income tax and VAT (value-added tax or consumption tax). Da 
Rin, et al. (2011) find a significant negative effect of corporate income taxes on firm 
entry rates. However, tax reductions only affect entry rates below a certain threshold of 
taxation and such tax reductions prove more effective given sound institutional 
infrastructure. Yet corporate taxes do not hinder innovation explicitly. A study by Zhu, et 
al. (2012) finds that 95% of the interviewees of the study, top managers and owners at 
SMEs (small to medium enterprises), say that the VAT (value-added tax) discourages 
innovation. For start-ups with high labor costs and low materials costs, the tax code does 
not permit production costs as a deduction from sales income. However, capital-intensive 
companies, such as manufacturing companies, deduct these costs from sales for tax 
purposes. For this reason, knowledge-intensive businesses face tax disadvantages under a 
high VAT. 
While evidence suggests that more business procedures increase fear of failure 
and knowing an entrepreneur decreases such fear, these determinants need further 
investigation. No study yet tests property rights, bankruptcy costs, and taxation systems 
as determinants of fear, yet they deserve attention as potential indicators due to their 
effects on entrepreneurial activity. In addition, existing literature focuses on the early 
2000’s as its empirical period, and updated data from the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor could affect results today.  
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2.  The Model 
The choice of models attempts to make use of cross-sectional time-series data, more 
commonly known as panel data. I use two balanced panel data sets: i) long panel model 
comprising of annual data from 2006 to 2014 for sixteen countries, and ii) short panel 
model comprising of annual data from 2011 to 2014 for thirty-seven countries. 
Additionally, I use a pooled OLS model of all data observations from the two panels. 
GEM data availability necessitates the two periods, 2006-2014 and 2011-
2014.  The 2011-2014 panel includes more countries from Asia and Africa than the 2006-
2014 panel. For instance, the 2006-2014 panel contains only one Asian country, while the 
2011-2014 panel contains five Asian countries. Figure 4 presents a complete list of 
countries in both panels. The greater number of countries included in the 2011-2014 
dataset may be due to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor experiencing better survey 
reach in later years, allowing the organization to collect more data from developing 
countries in Asia and Africa. 
In fact, the first regression I perform is a cross-sectional model including fifty 
countries for the most recent year of the data (2014). I use this regression to examine 
possible indicator variables and their relationships with fear of failure. 
2.1 Variables of Interest 
The dependent variable is the percentage of 18-64 year olds who indicate that fear of 
failure would prevent them from setting up a business. I examine both the distribution of 
the fear of failure and the distribution of the natural log of fear of failure. Given that the 
original fear of failure distribution more closely resembles a normal distribution than the 
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natural log of fear of failure, I use fear of failure (rather than its natural log) as my 
dependent variable. After studying several independent variables to examine each effect 
of the variable on fear of failure, I group the variables into three categories: demographic, 
property, and procedural. 
Demographic variables include the working age ratio (population of working age 
[15-64] divided by population in retirement age [65 and over]) and the percentage of the 
population living in an urban area. The property variable is a property rights index, 
valued on a scale from one to seven. The procedural variables include the number of 
procedures required to start a business, the cost of bankruptcy as a percentage of estate, 
and the corporate income tax. For the cross-sectional regression, VAT (value added tax) 
is included as a variable of interest, though I could not find any longitudinal data for this 
variable. Hence, this variable (VAT) is not included in the panel data regressions. I 
provide rationale for each variable’s inclusion under Section 2.4, Hypotheses 
Development. 
Several of the variables selected for these models stem from significant variables 
for studies examining fear of failure. Studies with the dependent variable of fear of 
failure prove limited, so I broaden the scope to studies that also examine firm entry rates. 
The data source for fear of failure in starting a business is from GEM’s database (Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor). The number of business procedures required to start a 
business, the working age ratio, and the percentage of the population living in an urban 
area are all from the World Bank. The property rights index is calculated by and available 
from the World Economic Forum. Regarding the tax rate statistics, historical corporate 
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income tax rates are available from KPMG and current VAT tax rates are from the 
United States Council for International Business. 
There is an endogeneity issue present in the data. Higher entrepreneurial activity 
levels reduce fear of failure, and this regression does not control for the lagged level of 
entrepreneurship. Therefore, while I frame fear of failure as a negative determinant for 
entrepreneurship levels, the entrepreneurship levels themselves may be a factor in 
determining fear of failure.  
2.2 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the year 2014 appear in Figure 1, statistics for the panel 2006-
2014 appear in Figure 2, and statistics for the panel 2011-2014 appear in Figure 3. To 
provide a picture of the dependent variable, the fear of failure statistics for 2014 include 
50 observations with a mean of 36.6% and a standard deviation of 9.1%. For the 2006-
2014 panel, the fear of failure statistics include 144 observations with a mean of 34.7% 
and a standard deviation of 8.64%. The 2011-2014 panel uses 148 observations to 
observe a mean of 35.8% and a standard deviation of 7.89%. Across the three different 
panels, averages for the variables appear relatively similar.  The panels for 2006-2014 
and 2011-2014 contain different countries with some overlap. The 2011-2014 panel is not 
a subset of the larger 2006-2014 panel.  
A correlation matrix for the cross-section (2014) shows relatively high 
correlations (around 50%) for the cost of bankruptcy with the percentage of the 
population living in an urban area, the working age ratio, the property rights index, and 
the number of procedures required to start a business (Figure 5). This may be due to more 
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industrialized countries with established bankruptcy laws, thus creating a higher average 
cost of bankruptcy as a percentage of estate. However, no variable displays a correlation 
of over 50% with all other variables.  
2.3 Cross-Sectional, Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, and Random Effects 
Models 
The cross-sectional model includes data from 50 countries for the year 2014 and all 
variables previously mentioned for the year 2014. 
Full cross-sectional model: 
𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖 +  𝛽6𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽7𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   
α is the intercept; βs are the coefficients or parameter estimates; and 𝜀𝑖 is the error 
term. 
Full pooled OLS model: 
𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
α is the intercept; βs are the coefficients or parameter estimates; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term.  
The pooled OLS model increases the number of observations in the regression by 
treating longitudinal data as additional observations unrelated to each other. It includes 
all variables except VAT due to lack of longitudinal data for this variable.  
Full fixed effects model: 
𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖)  +  𝛽1𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡   
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𝑢𝑖 is the time invariant fixed effects specific to each country; βs are the coefficients or 
parameter estimates; and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The fixed effects model recognizes country specific differences in each intercept. 
It includes all variables except VAT due to lack of longitudinal data for this variable. 
Full random effects model: 
𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + (𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡)  
The random effects model treats 𝑢𝑖 as country specific random heterogeneity by 
combining it with the error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡. It includes all variables except VAT due to lack of 
longitudinal data for this variable. 
The above equations show full models. In my analysis, I first use a parsimonious 
approach to examine the effects of just demographic variables (the percentage of the 
urban population and the working age ratio) (Model I). Next, I expand Model I by adding 
the property rights index variable (Model II). Finally, I use a full model inclusive of 
demographic, property, and procedural variables (number of business procedures 
required to start a business, cost of bankruptcy, and corporate income tax) (Model III). 
For the 2011-2014 panel, I use a fourth model that adds a dummy variable representing 
Asia to the full model (Model IV). 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
Past studies have shown that increased urbanization leads to decreasing fear of failure 
(Bosma and Schutjens 2010). Thus, I expect the coefficient for urbanization to be 
negative. The other demographic variable, the working age ratio, should also have an 
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inverse effect on fear of failure. The working age ratio serves as an indication of 
socioeconomic characteristics of the population. I calculate this variable as the ratio of 
the population aged 15-64 to the population 65 and over. This provides a proxy of the 
ratio of the working population to the non-working (retired) population. I acknowledge 
that the ratio is an imperfect indicator of the working population, as the age begins at 15. 
However, given publicly available data, this was the best proxy of working age I could 
find. Modigliani’s life-cycle hypothesis postulates more young people than old in a 
society results in more people saving than dissaving (Deaton 2005). Therefore, in an 
economy with a greater amount of young people, there will be greater savings and likely 
a more stable economy. Given a society with higher savings, more capital is available for 
investment. Thus, there will be a greater number of investors putting their savings to 
work through investment in start-ups or developing companies. With this in mind, I 
hypothesize that a higher working age ratio will decrease the country’s overall score for 
fear of failure.  
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒 15 𝑡𝑜 64
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒 65 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟
 
Regarding urbanization, Bosma and Schutjens (2010) discuss how an urban area 
leads to a greater spread of ideas among entrepreneurs and might reinforce risk-taking. 
Given the effect of urbanization on promoting entrepreneurial activity, I would also 
expect urbanization to decrease fear of failure.  
A study by Desai, et al. (2003) finds greater property rights to increase entry rates 
into entrepreneurial activity. Given the inverse relationship between fear of failure and 
entrepreneurial levels, I hypothesize for stronger property rights to decrease fear of 
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failure. Both my index of property rights used in this study and Desai’s measurement of 
property rights are identical (World Economic Forum). 
The number of business procedures required to start a business likely has a 
positive relationship with fear of failure, based on Bosma and Schutjens’s 2010 study. 
Bosma and Schutjens find the number of required start-up procedures positively correlate 
with fear of failure. Their measurement of business procedures shares the same source as 
my study’s measurement, the World Bank Doing Business Project. The cost of 
bankruptcy likely has a positive influence on fear of failure as well, due to greater 
consequences of business failure. A higher cost of bankruptcy also points to higher 
bankruptcy regulations, a dissuader of entering into business. I expect both the corporate 
income tax rate and VAT to increase fear of failure, yet for different reasons. Corporate 
income tax eats into corporate profits, with a higher corporate income tax discourages 
potential businesses from entering into production (Da Rin, et al. 2011). VAT will also 
have a positive effect on fear of failure. Zhu, et al. (2012) interview managers and owners 
in China and find the value added tax encourages projects with high capital expenditures 
due to tax deductions. This encourages producing manufacturing instead of tech, a wage-
driven yet lower capital-expenditure-intensive industry. Therefore, I expect VAT to have 
a positive effect on fear of failure as well. 
My paper tests the following hypotheses: 
 Fear of failure in starting a business is negatively associated with a greater urban 
population. 
 Fear of failure in starting a business is negatively associated with a higher 
percentage of the working age ratio. 
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 Fear of failure in starting a business is negatively associated with stronger 
property rights. 
 Fear of failure in starting a business is positively associated with a greater number 
of required procedures to start a business. 
 Fear of failure in starting a business is positively associated with a higher 
corporate income tax. 
 Fear of failure in starting a business is positively associated with a higher cost of 
bankruptcy for a firm. 
 Fear of failure in starting a business is positively associated with a higher value-
added tax (consumption tax).  
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3.  Methodology 
For the purposes of this study, I use cross-sectional, pooled OLS, fixed effects, and 
random effects regression models to examine how variables pertaining to demographics, 
property rights, and business procedures affect fear of failure in starting a business. The 
cross-sectional model examines the most recent year of completed data, 2014, to gain a 
general understanding of variable coefficients. The pooled OLS model includes the 
greatest number of observations (228), incorporating both observations from the 2006-
2014 panel and the 2011-2014 panel. I chose to include the period of 2011-2014 (short 
panel) for a greater number of countries, while the period of 2006-2014 (long panel) 
allows for a longer time horizon. Due to a greater amount of country variation in the 
2011-2014 panel, I also include “Asia” as a binary variable to examine the effect of 
belonging to the Asian continent on fear of failure.  
3.1 Hausman Test 
The Hausman test evaluates the consistency of an estimator compared to a less efficient 
estimator (Park 2011). It involves comparing two different estimators for the parameters 
of a model. If the “random effects” assumption fails but the model is otherwise fine, then 
the fixed effects estimator remains consistent and the random effects estimator is 
inconsistent. This comparison of the random and fixed effects estimators determines the 
accuracy of the random effects assumption. A random effects model is preferred under 
the null hypothesis or assumption due to higher efficiency when the p-value is not 
statistically significant (Stock and Watson 2014). Random effects are estimated with 
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shrinkage (“linear unbiased prediction”). Under the alternative hypothesis when the p-
value is statistically significant, a fixed effects model is consistent and preferred.  
After examining the Hausman test results for the panels 2006-2014 and 2011-
2014, I do not reject the null hypothesis for 2011-2014. In contrast, I do reject the null 
hypothesis for 2006-2014. Therefore, I prefer random effects as a model for my 2011-
2014 panel data and prefer fixed effects for my 2006-2014 panel data. All regression 
outputs are included in the tables for both panel periods.  
3.2 The Panels for 2006-2014 and 2011-2014 
The decision to use two models is based on the countries available for each period. While 
2006-2014 captures a longer time horizon, GEM does not measure fear of failure in the 
same countries every year and some countries surveyed in 2006 are not surveyed in 
certain subsequent years. The next section discusses further limitations of the data. 
Additionally, GEM surveys a wider range of countries in 2014 compared to 2006. The 
2006 survey includes forty-one countries, compared to one hundred and twenty-nine in 
2014. Therefore, choosing later years such as 2011-2014 provides greater variation in 
data by including more surveyed countries. 
To provide an idea of country variation, the 2011-2014 panel includes five Asian 
countries, while the 2006-2014 panel includes one Asian country. The 2011-2014 panel 
includes six South American countries, while the 2006-2014 panel includes three South 
American countries. Overall, the 2011-2014 panel contains thirty-seven countries, while 
the 2006-2014 panel includes sixteen countries. The 2011-2014 panel presents a greater 
number of countries and a wider range of country variation. 
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3.3 Limitations of the Data 
There are several limitations of the study, both affecting the variables measuring the fear 
of failure and the measurement of fear of failure itself. 
Fear of failure in starting a business, as measured by GEM, has some potential 
flaws. The survey measures different participants every year. An independent survey 
vendor conducts surveys at the same time of year (generally between April and June). 
The vendor submits a proposal for GEM data collection. GEM examines the raw data for 
a quality check evaluation and uniform statistical calculations before any data becomes 
publicly available. GEM calls 2,000 respondents over the phone, yet these are not the 
same 2,000 participants every year. Hence, while this represents overall country 
sentiment, it might not examine actual change over time for the same country. 
Theoretically, different participants could be surveyed in 2007 and produce a higher fear 
of failure percentage compared to 2006. The fear of failure statistic would change, 
regardless of whether or not these participants held the same views in 2006. However, 
GEM does use a representative national survey. 
Translation issues also abound. For instance, GEM calculates the actual fear of 
failure measure from participants responding to whether fear of failure is a significant 
hindrance for them to start a business. The survey vendor asks the question over the 
phone across dozens of countries and in dozens of different languages. Participants may 
not understand the question or the question’s connotation may translate differently in 
varied languages. Another measure, the property rights index, represents a subjective 
measure of participants’ responses to the question: “In your country, to what extent are 
property rights, including financial assets, protected?” This will also create translation 
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issues, as the written translation may result in different connotations as well. The 
direction of the bias is not clear. While this sentence translates to English in a certain 
way, the exact same connotation may not replicate across languages. 
Procedural variables are also measured with error. GEM bases the cost of 
bankruptcy, measured as a percentage of estate by the World Bank, on responses from 
questionnaire respondents. Therefore, this is not an accurate measurement of bankruptcy 
based on historical industry data. The World Bank sends a questionnaire to experts in 
insolvency, but these respondents still provide a guess based on a case study. Regarding 
the tax rates, corporate income tax data collection may be more accurate for certain 
countries than for others. When examining the data, Germany and Canada’s rates 
fluctuate across the past few years, yet certain countries maintain the same corporate 
income tax rate during the panel’s period. Additionally, prior literature studies this 
variable only as it relates to entrepreneurial activity. Corporate income tax has not been 
studied as it relates to fear of failure. The value-added tax rates, however, do not have 
historical data, since the VAT is only available as of the current period. I include this 
measurement for the cross-sectional analysis for descriptive purposes.  
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4.  Results 
4.1 2014 Cross-Section Results 
The cross-section results for 2014 provide a general baseline of contemporaneous 
relationships for fear of failure with the selected variables. I run the cross-sectional 
regression with heteroscedastic standard errors.  
Among the cross-section results, only the working age ratio is statistically 
significant (p < 0.01, Figure 6). For every one-point increase in the working age ratio, the 
percentage of respondents who indicate fear of failure would prevent them setting up a 
business decreases by 1.5 percentage points. The rest of the independent variables do not 
prove to be statistically significant, implying that any relationship presented could be 
purely by chance. 
4.2 Pooled OLS Model of 2006-2014 and 2011-2014 Data 
While the pooled OLS model only contains one statistically significant variable (the 
working age ratio), it is worth including due to the larger number of observations (n = 
228) and because all coefficients possess the expected sign as in my hypotheses. My 
hypotheses predict the urban population will have a negative coefficient, the working age 
ratio will have a negative coefficient, property rights will have a negative coefficient, 
business procedures will have a positive coefficient, cost of bankruptcy will have a 
positive coefficient, and income tax will have a positive coefficient. According to the 
pooled OLS model (Figure 7), all signs match the hypotheses.  
The working age ratio appears statistically significant in the pooled OLS 
regression. As the working age ratio increases by one, the percentage of the population 
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who feel fear of failure will prevent them from setting up a business decreases by 1.28 
percentage points. This is statistically significant at 0.1% level (p < 0.001, Figure 7). No 
other variables are statistically significant.   
4.3 2006-2014 Fixed Effects Results 
For the purpose of this section, I will focus on the fixed effects model due to the result of 
its Hausman test. However, I include a comparison between the fixed effects and random 
effects models in Section 4.6, A Comparison of Results between Fixed and Random 
Effects. Three different models examine the fixed effects regression: one focusing on the 
effect of demographic variables (Model I), another focusing on the effect of adding 
property rights (Model II), and another examining the explanatory power of the full 
model including procedural variables (Model III). There are a greater number of 
observations than the cross-sectional study due to the 2006-2014 panel’s longer period (nt 
= 144).  
In Model I, the percentage of the population living in an urban area is significant 
at the 1% significance level (p < 0.01, Model I, Figure 8). For each one-percentage point 
increase in the percentage of the population living in an urban area, the fear of failure 
percentage increases by 2.34 percentage points. The coefficient for the working age ratio 
is not statistically significant.  
The second model incorporates the property rights index as an independent 
variable (Model II, Figure 8). This variable is not significant at the 5% significance level. 
The third model incorporates the effects of income tax, the number of business 
procedures required to start a business, and the cost of bankruptcy as a percentage of 
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estate. None of the results appears statistically significant at the 5% level (Model III, 
Figure 8). 
4.4 2011-2014 Random Effects Results 
For the purpose of this section, I focus on the random effects model due to the result of 
its Hausman test. However, I include a comparison between fixed effects and random 
effects models in Section 4.6, A Comparison of Results between Fixed and Random 
Effects. Once again, three different models show the random effects regression: one 
focusing on the effect of demographic variables (Model I), another focusing on the effect 
of adding property rights (Model II), and another examining the explanatory power of the 
full model including procedural variables (Model III). While this random effects 
regression examines a shorter period than the 2006-2014 panel, a greater number of 
countries are included. As a result, a similar amount of observations exist between the 
2006-2014 panel and the 2011-2014 panel (nt = 148).  
Model I looks at the demographic variables in my study: percentage living in an 
urban area and the working age ratio. While living in an urban area is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level, the working age ratio is significant at the 1% level (p < 0.01, 
Figure 9). As the working age ratio increases by one point, the fear of failure percentage 
decreases by 1.2 percentage points.  
Model II examines the property rights index. While the coefficient is the same 
sign as the 2006-2014 panel (Figure 8), the coefficient itself is no longer close to 
statistically significant.  
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Model III adds the effect of procedural variables. None are statistically 
significant, though it should be noted that the coefficient of the cost of bankruptcy 
remains positive and close to statistical significance in both 2006-2014 and 2011-2014 
time periods. Throughout Model II and Model III, the coefficient for the working age 
ratio maintains its significance at the 1% significance level (p < 0.01, Figure 9). This is 
the only statistically significant variable in the 2011-2014 panel. 
4.5 2011-2014 Random Effects Results Including Asia 
To examine the effect of belonging to an Asian country, I include a dummy variable for 
“Asia” in the 2011-2014 random effects regression. I select this panel due to the panel 
containing five Asian countries (China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) versus 
the 2006-2014 panel, which only contains one Asian country (Japan). I assign a value of 
one to countries belonging to the Asian continent, while I assign a value of zero to 
countries not on the Asian continent.  
Model IV in Figure 9 illustrates the impact of adding the Asian binary variable. 
The coefficient for the working age ratio increases in statistical significance, while the 
binary variable for Asia also displays statistical significance at the 1% significance level 
(p < 0.001, Figure 9). Belonging to the Asian continent correlates with a 10.36% increase 
in the country’s fear of failure. In addition, the explanatory power of the model increases 
as well. The R2 increases from 17% to 37% due to the addition of the “Asia” binary 
variable.  
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4.6 A Comparison of Results between Fixed and Random Effects 
In this section, I compare the differences between the fixed and random effects version of 
each regression with a special emphasis on the regression not selected by the Hausman 
test.  
For the 2006-2014 panel, the Hausman test selects the fixed effects regression. 
With fixed effects, only the percentage of the population living in an urban area is 
significant. In comparison, under the random effects model, more variables are 
statistically significant. Additionally, the coefficient for the working age ratio is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (Model I, Figure 8, p < 0.01). Under random 
effects, each increase in the working age ratio decreases the percentage of fear of failure 
by 2.88 percentage points. In addition, under the second model for random effects, the 
coefficient for property rights is statistically significant (Figure 8). For every one point 
increase in the property rights index, the percentage of the population experiencing fear 
of failure decreases by 3.36 percentage points. In sum, the random effects model for 
2006-2014 shows property rights and the working age ratio to be statistically significant 
in contrast to the fixed effects model. However, both the fixed effects model and the 
random effects model do not find statistical significance among the procedural variables.  
For the 2011-2014 panel, the Hausman test selects the random effects regression. 
With fixed effects, there are no statistically significant variables. However, all coefficient 
signs of each independent variable are the same between the fixed effects and the random 
effects regressions with the exception of one. The coefficient for the income tax rate is 
positive under random effects and negative under fixed effects. Yet the income tax rate is 
not statistically significant. 
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5.  Conclusion 
It is difficult to assess the statistical significance of the independent variables given three 
different sample periods and results. The cross-sectional results emphasize the 
importance of the working age ratio, as this is the only statistically significant variable 
among this sample. However, with a low number of observations (n = 50), these results 
are not conclusive. What appears more robust is the working age ratio’s statistical 
significance in the pooled OLS model, featuring 228 observations from the combined 
panel periods. The pooled OLS model only finds statistical significance for the working 
age ratio, although it hints that my hypotheses may be correct based on the signs of the 
coefficients (Figure 7). It is possible that with an even greater number of observations, 
the additional variables included in the regression would reach statistical significance 
while holding the same signs.  
The working age ratio’s coefficient receives additional support as decreasing fear 
of failure — based on the cross-section, pooled OLS model, and two panel periods. Prior 
studies of cross-country regressions point to lower savings rates when the population 
share of the elderly is high, and Modigliani recognizes that a greater percentage of a 
younger population might generate increased saving due to retirement planning and as a 
buffer against unexpected emergencies (Deaton 2005). An economy with a greater 
amount of savings indicates a steadier society and may be the reason for its link with 
decreased fear of failure. In an economically stable environment, participants in this 
economy might be more inclined to start a business or less inclined to let fear hold them 
back. However, while I acknowledge that policymakers cannot significantly affect the 
working age ratio, there are additional variables policymakers should note. 
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One of the prime variables that deserve attention from policymakers is property 
rights. Stronger property rights decrease fear of failure in starting a business, based on 
this variable maintaining the same coefficient sign regardless of the data used: the cross-
section, the pooled OLS, the 2006-2014 panel, and the 2011-2014 panel. The property 
rights index is statistically significant in the 2006-2014 random effects panel and the 
2011-2014 random effects panel. Under a larger set of observations, the property rights 
index may appear statistically significant under all regression models. 
In addition, existing literature points to urbanization’s effect on fear of failure to 
be negative. The evidence regarding the percentage of the population living in an urban 
area is inconclusive: while it is statistically significant at the 1% significance level in the 
2006-2014 panel with fixed effects, the coefficient is positive. This is neither the 
coefficient sign I expected and nor what researchers have posited. It is also the opposite 
sign in the panel 2011-2014 (where the coefficient is negative). Thus, I draw no solid 
conclusion about the effect of urbanization from my research.  
The property rights index presents an avenue for future study to clarify the 
relationship between property rights and fear of failure in starting a business. While 
variables pertaining to demographics prove significant, a clear link between procedural 
variables and fear of failure is not established. To better understand the relationship 
between fear of failure and procedural variables, future studies should examine data that 
are more robust. 
Asia is another significant variable worthy of future study (Figure 9). Though the 
variable captures the condition of being on the Asian continent, it does not provide any 
further indication about aspects of Asian culture or society that increase fear of failure. It 
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may be possible that these countries are Asian outliers, as the data only represents five 
countries. From a demographic aspect, the “Asia” variable may be highly affected by the 
inclusion of Japan, a country with a high fear of failure rate and a high percentage of 
elderly. For future studies, more countries that are Asian should be included in the 
sample. Potential socioeconomic influences for a higher fear of failure may stem from the 
percentage of the population employed by large firms. Within Korea, chaebol firms 
receive favorable treatment from the government.. In Japan, the keiretsu form a 
conglomeration of businesses linked together. Both maintain dominance over their 
respective economies. Due to this pressure to secure corporate jobs, fewer citizens in 
these Asian countries may feel inclined to take the risk of starting their own firms. 
The limitations of this study fall into three categories: nonrepeating data 
collection, endogeneity of fear of failure, and self-reported measures. For one, GEM does 
not collect fear of failure measures for all countries every year. This results in spotty data 
collection and prevents many countries from being included to create a rich panel. With a 
greater number of observations, the model’s independent variables have a higher 
likelihood of being statistically significant. 
Another caveat with my study is the potential problem in treating "fear of failure" 
as a dependent variable when in fact it could correlate with other variables that affect 
entrepreneurial activity, such as the labor market, regulation, demographics, culture, 
etc.  This leads to endogeneity concerns — if fear of failure correlates with 
entrepreneurial activity levels, the entrepreneurial activity levels are themselves likely to 
affect fear of failure. A higher initial level of entrepreneurial activity may decrease fear 
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of failure since prospective entrepreneurs see successful models of startup activity around 
them. 
Finally, participants self-report several of the independent variables, such as the 
property rights index and the cost of bankruptcy. Individual perceptions and experiences 
with a government institution will cause self-reporting to be biased. Instead, an unbiased 
third party or legislative evidence could determine the calculation of these measures 
better than public sentiment. 
5.1  Opportunities for Future Research 
Several opportunities exist as avenues for future research. For one, certain variables that 
produce mixed coefficient signs should be re-examined with a larger set of observations. 
In particular, additional researchers could test the percentage of the population living in 
an urban area as an independent variable for a different sample period of fear of failure 
rates. To explore the existing variables mentioned in this study, further studies could 
investigate the elements that make up the property rights index.  
One important aspect of failure not captured in this study could be a more detailed 
study of the cultural perspective of failure. The continents each country belongs to could 
be a possible measurement. While this regression includes a specific variable for Asia, 
another could be included for Europe, North America, and South America. This way, 
researchers could compare continental differences. For example, this analysis could 
examine if Asian countries might have higher or lower fear of failure rates than North 
American countries. I chose not to do such for this study due to further reducing the 
degrees of freedom of the regression. Future studies examining fear of failure could also 
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utilize non self-reported measures and provide a more reliable perspective of property 
rights or cost of bankruptcy. Additionally, researchers could study the role of the value-
added tax in further detail if historical data could be included for this measure. 
This study provides greater insight into what affects fear of failure from a 
demographic and institutional perspective. This study also seeks to expand the 
understanding of fear of failure from simply a regionally focused one. It highlights 
indicators that could decrease fear of failure for several different countries, instead of 
simply proposing a variable to affect one country or one type of country. By increasing 
the scope of fear of failure to an international context, my study attempts to detect factors 
that can affect fear of failure despite regional differences. However, as captured by the 
“Asia” variable, inherent regional differences do still exist and cause difficulty in fitting a 
linear equation to the data. Determinants of fear of failure prove limited from the scope of 
this study, yet a greater focus on property rights and an investigative analysis of 
procedural variables will serve policymakers well for influencing entrepreneurial fear of 
failure.  
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Figures  
Figure 1: Descriptive statistics for the cross-section, 2014 (n = 50). 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. dev. Median 
Fear of failure (%) 13.7 61.58 36.55 9.1 37.62 
Population living in urban areas (%) 32.37 100 71.44 16.45 73.97 
Working age ratio 2.39 18.18 6.35 3.74 4.57 
Property rights index 2.62 6.39 4.8 0.96 4.67 
Number of procedures required to 
start a business 2 16 6.5 3.07 
 
6 
Income tax rate (%) 12.5 40 25.05 6.04 25 
Cost of bankruptcy, as a percentage 
of estate (%) 1 32 11.37 6.43 
 
9.5 
Value added tax rate (%) 0 27 15.04 6.38 15 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Descriptive statistics for the panel, 2006-2014 (nt = 144). 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. dev. Median 
Fear of failure (%) 15.12 61.58 34.7 8.64 34.17 
Population living in urban areas (%) 49.7 97.82 79.56 11.89 80.99 
Working age ratio 2.39 11.12 4.66 1.76 4.05 
Property rights index 2.47 6.51 5.16 0.99 5.41 
Number of procedures required to 
start a business 3 16 7.41 3.56 
 
6 
Income tax rate (%) 16 40.69 28.29 7.22 28 
Cost of bankruptcy, as a percentage 
of estate (%) 1 18 8.47 4.75 
 
9 
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Figure 3: Descriptive statistics for the panel, 2011-2014 (nt = 148). 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. dev. Median 
Fear of failure (%) 14 61.58 35.79 7.89 35.89 
Population living in urban areas 
(%) 39.29 100 73.53 14.8 
75.74 
Working age ratio 2.39 13.26 5.74 2.82 4.5 
Property rights index 0 6.45 4.79 1.07 4.85 
Number of procedures required to 
start a business 3 14 6.64 2.80 
 
6 
Income tax rate (%) 10 40.69 24.7 7.12 25 
Cost of bankruptcy, as a percentage 
of estate (%) 1 36 10.3 6 
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35 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Fear of failure averages for 2006-2014 and 2011-2014, by country. 
 
Percentage of 18-64 
population who indicate 
that fear of failure would 
prevent them from setting 
up a business 
  
Percentage of 18-64 
population who indicate 
that fear of failure would 
prevent them from setting 
up a business 
Country 2006-2014 2011-2014  Country 2006-2014 2011-2014 
Argentina 28.76 25.84  Norway 30.26 38.18 
Belgium 37.48 44.37  Panama - 18.55 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
- 27.57  Peru - 31.54 
Brazil 33.57 34.19  Poland - 46.05 
Chile 26.21 27.86  Portugal - 40.10 
China - 36.32  Romania - 38.88 
Colombia - 30.98  Russia - 39.62 
Croatia 32.89 33.95  Singapore - 40.00 
Finland 31.68 35.49  Slovakia - 34.82 
France 42.75 40.57  Slovenia 28.22 29.25 
Germany - 40.61  South Africa - 26.93 
Greece 50.35 52.49  Spain 41.72 38.75 
Hungary 33.18 39.00  Sweden - 35.08 
Ireland - 37.09  Switzerland - 30.02 
Japan 44.96 49.81  Thailand - 49.24 
Lithuania - 40.53  
United 
Kingdom 
34.26 36.33 
Malaysia - 31.61  United States 28.56 31.07 
Mexico - 28.37  Uruguay - 28.80 
Netherlands 30.32 34.28     
 
  
 
Figure 5: Correlation matrix for variables of interest, cross-section of 2014. 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Fear of failure -        
2. Population living in urban areas .03 -       
3. Working age ratio -.47 -.47 -      
4. Property rights index .05 .47 -.31 -     
5. Number of procedures required to 
start a business 
.17 -.43 .56 -.46 -    
6. Income tax rate .03 .27 .11 -.03 .36 -   
7. Cost of bankruptcy, as a percentage of 
estate 
-.20 -.52 .55 -.48 .56 .09 -  
8. Value added tax rate .12 .05 -.34 -.14 -.11 -.32 -.13 - 
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Figure 6: Regression results for the cross-section, 2014. 
 Dep. var. = Percentage of 
respondents in a country 
who indicate that fear of 
failure would prevent them 
from setting up a business. 
 Coeff. (β) 
Intercept 55.15*** 
(12.88) 
Demographic  
Population living in urban areas -0.18 
(0.10) 
Working age ratio -1.54** 
(0.44) 
Property  
Property rights index -0.220 
(1.56) 
Procedural  
Number of business procedures required to start 
a business 
-0.03 
(0.59) 
Income tax rate 0.27 
(0.26) 
Cost of bankruptcy, as a percentage of estate -0.07 
(0.25) 
Value added tax -0.04 
(0.22) 
  
Number of observations (N) 50 
F statistic (df) 2.59 
Adjusted R2 0.19 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 7: Regression results for the pooled OLS panel, including both 2006-2014 and 2011-2014 
observations (duplicates deleted). 
 Dep. var. = Percentage of 
respondents in a country who 
indicate that fear of failure 
would prevent them from 
setting up a business. 
 Coeff. (β) 
Intercept 38.6*** 
(4.83) 
Demographic  
Population living in urban areas -0.02 
(0.24) 
Working age ratio -1.28*** 
(0.24) 
Property  
Property rights index -0.27 
(0.65) 
Procedural  
Number of business procedures required to start 
a business 
0.12 
(0.20) 
Income tax rate 0.14 
(0.09) 
Cost of bankruptcy, as a percentage of estate 0.13 
(0.13) 
  
Number of observations (N) 228 
F statistic (df) 5.51 
Adjusted R2 0.11 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 8: Regression results for the panel, 2006-2014. 
Dependent variable: Percentage of respondents in a country who indicate that fear of failure would prevent them from setting up a business. 
 
Model I Model II Model III 
 FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled 
Demographic          
Population living in urban 
areas 
2.34** 
(0.68) 
0.28* 
(0.14) 
0.13* 
(0.06) 
1.93** 
(2.59) 
0.30* 
(0.14) 
0.18** 
(0.06) 
1.92* 
(0.81) 
0.26* 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
Working age ratio -0.23 
(2.35) 
-2.88** 
(0.85) 
-1.94*** 
(0.39) 
-.006 
(0.00) 
-2.95*** 
(0.84) 
-2.29*** 
(0.41) 
-0.26 
(2.54) 
-3.13*** 
(0.83) 
-2.97*** 
(0.44) 
Property     
 
     
Property rights index    -2.44 
(1.76) 
-3.36** 
(1.14) 
-1.62** 
(0.75) 
-2.44 
(2.06) 
-2.75* 
(1.15) 
0.51 
(0.97) 
Procedural          
Number of business 
procedures 
      -0.30 
(0.39) 
0.23 
(0.32) 
0.87** 
(0.26) 
Income tax rate       0.13 
(0.32) 
0.12 
(0.19) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
Cost of bankruptcy       0.71 
(0.63) 
0.24 
(0.33) 
0.16 
(0.21) 
          
Number of observations (N) 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.18 0.17 0.009 0.20 0.26 
Fixed effects? Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
Random effects? No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 9: Regression results for the panel, 2011-2014. 
Dependent variable: Percentage of respondents in a country who indicate that fear of failure would prevent them from setting up a business. 
 
Model I  Model II Model III Model IV 
 FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled 
Demographic             
Population living in 
urban areas 
-0.65 
(0.89) 
-0.005 
(0.07) 
-0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.60 
(0.90) 
0.002 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.27 
(1.02) 
-0.01 
(0.1) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.27 
(1.02) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
Working age ratio -2.60 
(2.25) 
-1.19** 
(0.38) 
-1.17*** 
(0.21) 
-2.28 
(2.31) 
-1.19** 
(0.38) 
-1.16*** 
(0.22) 
-1.70 
(2.35) 
-1.37** 
(0.43) 
-1.22*** 
(0.25) 
-1.70 
(2.35) 
-1.66*** 
(0.38) 
-1.57*** 
(0.22) 
Property     
 
        
Property rights index    -0.76 
(1.21) 
-0.24** 
(0.83) 
0.27 
(0.63) 
-0.50 
(1.24) 
-0.24* 
(0.86) 
-0.05 
(0.71) 
-0.50 
(1.24) 
-0.74 
(0.82) 
-1.25 
(0.65) 
Procedural             
Number of business 
procedures 
      -0.49 
(0.51) 
-0.38 
(0.32) 
-0.30 
(0.26) 
-0.49 
(0.51) 
-0.43 
(0.29) 
-0.54* 
(0.23) 
Income tax rate       -0.02 
(0.28) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.28) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
0.19* 
(0.09) 
Cost of bankruptcy       0.40 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(0.19) 
0.004 
(0.14) 
0.40 
(0.27) 
0.13 
(0.17) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
Asia          (omitted) 10.36*** 
(2.94) 
10.82*** 
(1.66) 
             
Number of 
observations (N) 
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.37 0.35 
Fixed effects? Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
Random effects? No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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